Beginning Sunday night and into Monday morning Marion Watch Investigates teams were reaching out to officials for comment on rumors of fraud in the City’s Fahey account. All city council advised that they were told not to comment on this and another rumor about possible findings for recovery or other citations by the Ohio Auditor of State which are supposedly on the near horizon according to anonymous general public sources.
The financial crisis in the Marion City Auditor’s office has entered a new, alarming phase. Sources report that the city has suffered its second instance of fraudulent activity this year, a breach of about $40,000 made even more disturbing by the fact that it occurred in a brand new bank account.
Leaving the public to continue wondering “who’s driving the ship” in the Marion City Auditor’s office? Neither the mayor nor the treasurer were aware of the fraud as stated in the Marion City Council Committee meeting Monday night.
This new account was recently opened by the city specifically because the old account was closed “due to the very same types of issues.”
This revelation proves that the city’s financial vulnerabilities are not tied to a single “bad” account but are the result of a systemic and persistent failure of core financial controls. The problem was never the account number; it was the broken process for managing it.
This is a direct, real-world example of the “Silent Sabotage” that Marion Watch research has documented: a failure of basic controls and an adherence to outdated, high-risk practices that are just as damaging as intentional theft dating back at least 40 years so far.
The Paper Check: An ‘Accepted’ Form of Sabotage
The key to this new fraud is the “very same types of issues” that forced the closure of the old account. Marion Watch research has identified this vulnerability as a catastrophic, multi-year reliance on an antiquated and insecure process: paying city vendors with paper checks, broken or misconfigured software—known by the former Schertzer Administration since the New World software was installed around 2008 (fixed in 2025), and other major information systems and financial control issues.
In 2025, it is not standard practice for a municipality to rely on paper checks for the bulk of its transactions. This practice is a form of “Silent Sabotage” by negligence—a choice to remain vulnerable.
While modern electronic payments (like ACH) are fast, encrypted, and create an instant, verifiable audit trail, paper checks are the opposite. They are a physical invitation for fraud.
Marion Watch team members with relevant experience recognize these types of issues and why this practice is “not standard” and is, in fact, a critical vulnerability:
Extreme Fraud Risk: Paper checks are the payment method most susceptible to fraud. They can be stolen from mailboxes, “washed” with chemicals to erase the ink, and then rewritten to a different payee or for a different amount.
Data Exposure: Every paper check is a data breach in an envelope. It contains the city’s bank account number and routing number, handing criminals all the information they need to create counterfeit checks or attempt unauthorized electronic withdrawals.
A “Black Hole” of Control: Unlike electronic payments, paper checks create a “black hole.” It can take days or weeks for a check to be mailed, deposited, and cleared, making it impossible to detect fraud in real-time.
By simply opening a new account without fixing this fundamental control weakness, the city all but guaranteed that the “same types of issues” would happen again. The fraudulent activity simply followed the broken, high-risk process to the new account.
Active Theft vs. Passive Negligence
This “Silent Sabotage” by negligence—choosing to use an insecure system—is just as damaging as active, intentional theft.
Marion Watch research into the city’s financial history provides a clear comparison. The case of Brenda Nwosu, a former city utility supervisor, is an example of active sabotage.
Nwosu was prosecuted for stealing tens of thousands of dollars over 3.5 years (from January 2011 to August 2014). This theft went undetected by the city and was supposedly only discovered by the State Auditor, proving that internal controls to stop active fraud were already broken.
Today, the city faces a passive sabotage. The failure of officials to abandon the insecure paper check system creates the vulnerability that allows external fraud (like the two recent instances) to succeed.
The result is the same. Whether an employee actively steals from the inside or an official’s negligence leaves the door open for an outsider to steal, or inadequate software safety controls—mandated by state and federal law are not in place—the taxpayer is the one who loses.
This is the critical context for Monday’s contentious City Council committee meeting. The council’s 3-0 “misfeasance” vote on a separate $58,000 unapproved payment was not in a vacuum. It was the action of a legislative body reacting to a pattern of ongoing financial disasters, including a first instance of fraud this year, and now a second instance on a “brand new account” that was supposed to fix the problem.
Several Marion City Council members are asking if accountability will ever truly be realized for the past and current issues.

