I. Introduction: The Current Crisis and Its Deep Roots

The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East was dramatically reshaped on June 21, 2025, when the United States directly intervened with military force, striking key nuclear facilities within Iran. This unprecedented action marked a critical escalation, effectively inserting the U.S. into an ongoing conflict that had seen Israel conducting military operations against Iran’s nuclear capabilities for over a week.¹

This U.S. military action was not an isolated event but rather the culmination of escalating tensions. It followed a series of intense Israeli attacks on Iranian military and nuclear infrastructure, which had begun on June 13, 2025. Israel’s initial campaign specifically targeted critical nuclear facilities, missile factories, and high-ranking military officials, including the commander-in-chief of Iran’s military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.² The direct U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear sites represents a significant and unprecedented escalation in the long-standing US-Iran conflict. This shift from indirect engagement or sanctions to overt military force on Iranian soil marks a new and critical phase, raising the stakes considerably.

The core objective of this investigative article is to meticulously trace the historical milestones, pivotal policy decisions, and evolving geopolitical dynamics that have shaped US-Iran relations. The narrative will specifically focus on how these interconnected events progressively led to the direct U.S. military intervention against Iran’s nuclear sites in June 2025, examining the interplay of perceived threats, strategic interests, and ideological clashes that define this protracted conflict. The U.S. decision to resort to direct military force, despite previous diplomatic efforts and pledges to avoid “stupid wars,” signals a profound shift in its perceived cost-benefit analysis regarding the Iranian nuclear threat, indicating that prior strategies were deemed insufficient. President Trump had previously expressed a preference for diplomacy and had even urged Israeli Prime Prime Minister Netanyahu to delay military action.¹ The ultimate decision to launch “massive precision strikes” and “obliterate” sites suggests that the U.S. leadership concluded that the perceived “imminent threat” posed by Iran’s nuclear program, particularly its breakout capability, necessitated a direct military solution, overriding concerns about regional escalation or prior non-interventionist rhetoric.¹ This implies a judgment that the risk of an Iranian nuclear weapon outweighed the risks of direct military confrontation.

II. The June 2025 Strikes: A Direct Intervention

On June 21, 2025, the United States military launched “massive precision strikes” against three pivotal Iranian nuclear sites: Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan.¹ These strikes marked a direct and unprecedented intervention by the U.S. into the ongoing conflict, which had seen Israel conducting military operations against Iran’s nuclear capabilities for over a week.³

The tactics employed in these strikes were designed to neutralize Iran’s most heavily fortified nuclear infrastructure. The Fordo nuclear fuel enrichment plant, notably buried deep within a mountain, was targeted with 14 “bunker-buster” bombs, specifically the 30,000-pound (13,500-kilogram) GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator.³ This marked the first time this powerful weapon had been used in combat.³ In addition to the aerial bombardment, U.S. submarines participated in the attacks, launching approximately 30 Tomahawk land attack missiles.³ 

President Donald Trump publicly declared the operation a “spectacular military success,” asserting that the targeted sites were “completely and fully obliterated”.¹ He issued a stark warning, stating that Iran “must now make peace” and that there would be further strikes on “other targets with precision, speed and skill” if peace did not materialize swiftly.¹

In the immediate aftermath, Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization confirmed the attacks but insisted that its nuclear program would not be stopped.⁴ Initial reports from Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicated no immediate signs of radioactive contamination at the three targeted locations.³

Marion Watch has been publishing on social media regarding this situation and the views locally seem to point to support for destruction of the Iranian Nuclear program. Statistics indicated early last week that the United States was beginning to move operational equipment intensifying with the movement of tankers, diversion of commercial aircraft, and finally the movement of B-2 Stealth Bombers.

III. The Genesis of Distrust: Early US-Iran Relations and the 1953 Coup

The relationship between the United States and Iran was not always one of antagonism. In fact, there was an often-overlooked period of positive interaction that significantly predated the pivotal events of 1953 and 1979.⁷ The U.S. was initially perceived more favorably than the traditional imperial powers of Britain and Russia. For instance, after World War I, Washington advocated on behalf of Iran during the Paris Peace Talks, and again after World War II, it opposed Russian troops instigating secessionist movements in northern Iran.⁷ This early period fostered a mutual fascination, with Iranian reformists drawing inspiration from American democracy and constitutionalism, exemplified by the popular American treasurer general Morgan Shuster, who reorganized Iran’s finances in 1911 and became a hero to the Iranian constitutional movement.⁸

Operation Ajax: The Overthrow of Mosaddegh and its Enduring Legacy

The trajectory of this nascent amity was irrevocably altered by the 1953 coup d’état, known as Operation Ajax in the U.S. and Operation Boot by British intelligence.⁹ This event stands as the foundational moment that transformed a potentially positive relationship into one marked by deep-seated distrust and anti-American sentiment. The U.S., in covert collaboration with the U.K., orchestrated the overthrow of Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh.⁹ The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has formally acknowledged its central role in this operation, confirming its participation in planning and executing the coup.¹¹

The primary motivations behind this intervention were twofold: a fear that Mosaddegh’s nationalist policies, particularly his nationalization of the British-controlled oil industry, might push Iran closer to the Soviet Union, a significant Cold War concern.⁹ Additionally, there was a strong desire to protect Western economic interests in Iran’s vital oil industry.⁹ This Cold War rationale, combined with economic imperatives, drove the decision to back the authoritarian Shah. The immediate consequence was the restoration of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power, establishing an authoritarian regime that was heavily reliant on U.S. backing.⁹ The long-term impact was profound: this intervention branded the U.S. as a “semi-colonial power” in the eyes of many Iranians, igniting deep anti-U.S. sentiment and fostering the rise of opposition forces, most notably the religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.⁹ The costs of the coup in stoking paranoia, enabling repression, and undermining the Pahlavis’ legitimacy vastly outweighed its short-term benefits.⁷ This illustrates how short-term strategic calculations had profound, long-term, and largely unintended consequences, transforming a potential ally into a deeply entrenched ideological foe.

The Shah’s Authoritarian Rule: US Support and Growing Iranian Resentment

Following the coup, the Shah’s rule from 1953 to 1979 was characterized by its secular and increasingly authoritarian nature, coupled with a strong pro-Western orientation and ambitious modernization efforts.¹³ The U.S. strategically positioned Iran under the Shah as a cornerstone of its security architecture in the Persian Gulf, particularly after Britain’s military withdrawal from the region in 1971.⁷ This close alliance deepened significantly in the 1970s, coinciding with the Shah’s increasingly dictatorial governance, widespread corruption, and the influx of vast sums of money from escalating oil prices.⁸

Crucially, this period also saw mounting domestic discontent. Many Iranians grew displeased with the Shah’s perceived disregard for religious values, his government’s close ties with the U.S., the brutal repression of political dissent, and modernization policies (such as land reform and women’s suffrage) that were viewed by traditionalists and religious groups as a direct assault on cherished values and cultural identity.⁷ The U.S.’s sustained support for the Shah’s increasingly autocratic and pro-Western regime, despite growing internal dissent, inextricably linked the U.S. to the Shah’s unpopularity and inadvertently laid the groundwork for the anti-American nature of the 1979 revolution. The Shah’s rule became “increasingly dictatorial” and corrupt, with a “much more robust” alliance with the U.S. in the 1970s.⁸ This alignment alienated large segments of the Iranian population who felt the Shah prioritized “another country, rather than his own people and their values”.¹³ The revolution, therefore, was not merely against the Shah but also against perceived U.S. influence, leading to Iran’s transformation into a “seethingly anti-American regime”.⁷ This demonstrates how U.S. foreign policy, by aligning with an unpopular authoritarian, contributed to the very anti-American sentiment it would later confront.

Year	Event	Brief Description	Impact on US-Iran Relations
1911	Morgan Shuster sent to reorganize Iran’s finances	American financial advisor becomes a hero to Iranian constitutional movement.	Positive relations, admiration for American constitutionalism.8
1919	Wilson administration opposes British protectorate	U.S. vocally opposes British attempts to turn Iran into a de facto protectorate.	Pro-American sentiment, high point in relations.8
1953	CIA-backed coup (Operation Ajax) overthrows PM Mosaddegh	U.S. and U.K. orchestrate the removal of democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh.	Restores Shah, paints U.S. as semi-colonial, fuels anti-U.S. sentiment, rise of Khomeini.9
1953-1979	Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s authoritarian rule with U.S. support	U.S. backs the Shah’s secular, modernizing, but increasingly dictatorial regime.	Deepens U.S. stake in Iran, but fosters internal resentment against corruption, repression, and Western influence.9

IV. The Revolution and the Rise of the Islamic Republic: A New Era of Antagonism

The 1979 Islamic Revolution represented a profound and unexpected rupture for Washington, decisively abrogating the Pahlavi dynasty and challenging previously axiomatic assumptions about religion, modernity, and political development.⁷ The underlying factors leading to the revolution were multifaceted: widespread discontent stemming from the Shah’s authoritarianism, political repression, lack of democratic participation, and pervasive corruption.¹⁴ Economic grievances, including uneven development, wealth disparity, high poverty, and unemployment, exacerbated by an overreliance on oil revenues, also fueled popular frustration.¹⁴ Furthermore, growing social tensions arose from the Shah’s aggressive modernization policies (known as the White Revolution), which were perceived by influential Islamic clergy and traditional groups as a direct assault on cherished religious values and cultural identity.¹⁴

The immediate outcome was the overthrow of the Shah, who departed Iran in January 1979, never to return. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, returning from exile, swiftly declared Iran an Islamic Republic, fundamentally transforming the country from a close U.S. ally into an openly anti-American theocracy.¹⁰ The 1979 Islamic Revolution fundamentally reoriented Iran’s foreign policy from a U.S. ally to an ideological adversary, driven by anti-Western, anti-imperialist, and religious sentiments. The revolution “abrogated the Pahlavi dynasty” and “scuttled a set of assumptions” about political development ⁷, transforming Iran into an “openly anti-American” country.¹³ This shift was directly fueled by “anti-imperialist sentiments” linked to the Shah’s close ties with the U.S. ¹⁴ and Khomeini’s explicit identification of the U.S. as the “prominent rival of the Islamic Republic”.⁹ This ideological transformation is paramount for understanding the subsequent decades of antagonism and the deeply ingrained nature of the conflict.

The Hostage Crisis: Solidifying Mutual Antagonism and US Sanctions Policy

The Iran Hostage Crisis, which commenced on November 4, 1979, and lasted 444 days until January 1981, served as a defining symbol of the end of cordial diplomacy and the solidification of mutual animosity.⁹ Radical Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking American diplomats hostage for over a year.⁹ The immediate U.S. response was swift and impactful: President Jimmy Carter, on November 14, 1979, froze Iranian government assets held in the United States. This marked the first significant application of the expansive authorities granted by the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for imposing sanctions.¹⁶ This action set a crucial precedent, establishing Washington’s increasing reliance on economic pressure as a primary tool against Iran.¹⁶

International reactions to these sanctions were mixed: while some U.S. allies recalled their ambassadors, other nations, including the Soviet Union, China, Mexico, Austria, Poland, and Sweden, either normalized or even expanded trade relations with Tehran, thereby limiting the multilateral effectiveness of the initial U.S. measures.¹⁶ The long-term impact of the crisis was profound: it “set the emotional and psychological context among Americans for nearly everything that was to come between the United States and Iran”.¹⁶ Simultaneously, it taught Iran that it could “generate leverage with the United States” through such actions.¹⁶ The Iran Hostage Crisis served as a critical catalyst, solidifying the U.S.’s reliance on economic sanctions as its primary tool of pressure against Iran, a policy that would persist for decades and contribute significantly to Iran’s economic vulnerability. President Carter’s freezing of Iranian assets in November 1979 was the “first time a U.S. president used the expansive authorities” of IEEPA ¹⁶ and “set the context for U.S.-Iran relations since”.¹⁶ This demonstrates a direct causal link between the hostage crisis and the long-term U.S. strategy of economic pressure, which would later evolve into “crippling economic sanctions”.⁹ This policy choice, born from a specific crisis, became a defining feature of the bilateral relationship.

The Resurgence of Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions Post-Revolution

Iran’s nuclear program, a subject of intense international scrutiny for decades, actually traces its origins back to the Shah’s era in the 1950s. It began with U.S. support under President Dwight Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program, leading to the construction of Iran’s first nuclear research facility in Tehran in 1957.¹⁸ The Shah harbored ambitious plans for building over 20 nuclear power reactors and developing a full domestic nuclear fuel cycle, despite underlying U.S. skepticism about his ultimate intentions.¹⁸

Following the revolution, the program experienced a significant pause. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini initially opposed nuclear development, viewing it as a symbol of Western influence, leading to the shelving of many ongoing projects.¹⁸ However, the program resumed and accelerated secretly during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. This revival was primarily driven by the new leadership’s paramount concern for “regime survivability” in a hostile regional environment.¹⁸ After Khomeini’s death in 1989, the new supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, further expanded Iran’s undeclared nuclear activities.¹⁸ During this period, Iran illicitly acquired crucial centrifuge technology, notably through the nuclear smuggling network led by Abdul Qadeer Khan.¹⁸ Iran’s post-revolution nuclear program, initially paused due to ideological opposition, was revived and accelerated primarily as a strategic imperative for regime survival in a hostile regional environment, directly linking its nuclear ambitions to its perceived vulnerability rather than solely aggressive intent. While the Shah had nuclear ambitions, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini initially opposed nuclear development as a symbol of Western influence.¹⁸ However, the program’s resumption and expansion after the revolution were “directly aligned with the central priority of its leadership: the survivability of its regime,” particularly in the context of the bitter eight-year war with Iraq.¹⁸ This suggests that the nuclear program became a defensive strategic asset for self-preservation, a response to perceived existential threats.¹⁸ This provides a crucial nuance, highlighting that Iran’s nuclear drive is not solely about offensive capabilities but also deeply rooted in its security concerns.

Iran’s Strategic Calculus: Regime Survival and Regional Influence

The stated purpose of Iran’s nuclear program by Iranian officials is for civilian uses, such as nuclear energy and medical purposes.¹⁷ However, this claim is viewed with skepticism by international observers, who point to Iran’s uranium enrichment and stockpiling beyond levels needed for civilian purposes, suggesting a covert development of nuclear weapons.¹⁹

The motivations underpinning Iran’s nuclear ambitions are widely analyzed and include several key factors:

• Regime Survival: The program is seen as a vital means to protect the Iranian regime and the nation from foreign aggression and external dominance. This motivation is deeply ingrained, particularly after the traumatic experience of the Iran-Iraq War.¹⁸
• Regional Power Projection: Beyond defense, the program also functions as an instrument of Iranian aggression and hegemony, enabling the projection of power and influence across the Middle East.¹⁹
• Deterrence: The pursuit of nuclear capability is viewed as a potential nuclear deterrent, particularly in response to existing atomic efforts by regional rivals like India, Pakistan, and Israel.²²
• Techno-nationalist Pride: The program symbolizes scientific progress, national independence, and a rejection of foreign dominance, fostering a sense of techno-nationalist pride within Iran.¹⁹

The U.S. and Israel, among others, articulate significant concerns that a nuclear-capable Iran could use its capabilities to threaten Israel’s existence, intensify support for terrorism and insurgency, and heighten fears of nuclear terrorism through the potential transfer of technology to non-state actors or radical states.¹⁹

V. The Nuclear Standoff: Sanctions, Diplomacy, and Escalation (2000s-2015)

A pivotal moment in the nuclear standoff occurred in 2002 when Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear facilities at Natanz, an enrichment site, and Arak, a heavy water reactor site, were publicly revealed.¹⁸ This discovery immediately “heightened global concern about a nuclear weaponry program”.⁹ Further underscoring Iran’s secrecy, the Fordow enrichment facility, whose construction began around 2007, was only disclosed to the IAEA in 2009 after Western intelligence agencies independently became aware of its existence.¹⁹ The public revelation of Iran’s secret nuclear facilities in 2002 was the definitive trigger that transformed international concern into formal, urgent scrutiny and the imposition of a multilateral sanctions regime. Prior to 2002, Iran’s nuclear program existed, but the discovery of undeclared sites like Natanz and Arak immediately “heightened global concern” about a weapons program.⁹ This led directly to IAEA investigations ⁹ and, crucially, a series of UN Security Council resolutions demanding compliance. This marks a clear shift from a less visible, potentially ambiguous program to one under intense, formalized international pressure and monitoring.

IAEA Scrutiny and UN Security Council Resolutions

In response to these revelations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) launched extensive investigations, a core part of its mission to monitor and verify compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Iran had signed in 1970.⁹ The investigations revealed that Iran had pursued sensitive nuclear work secretly for nearly two decades without informing the IAEA.¹⁸ This lack of transparency and non-compliance led to a series of binding UN Security Council resolutions (e.g., 1737, 1747, 1803, 1929) adopted between 2006 and 2010.²³ These resolutions explicitly demanded that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment activities, fully cooperate with IAEA investigations, and halt the construction of its heavy-water reactor and related projects.³¹ Despite initial temporary compliance in 2003, Iran repeatedly restarted its enrichment program as negotiations faltered.²³

The Imposition of Crippling Economic Sanctions

Iran’s persistent “stalling tactics” and continued non-compliance with international demands prompted the U.S. and the European Union to impose increasingly severe economic sanctions.⁹ These sanctions were strategically designed to target Iran’s most vital economic sectors, including oil, gas, petrochemicals, banking, and shipping, with the explicit aim of destabilizing its economy and forcing it to renegotiate its nuclear program on international terms.⁹ The impact was significant, inflicting “dire economic strain” on the Iranian economy.⁹ It is important to note the long history of U.S. unilateral sanctions against Iran, which began as early as 1979 with the asset freeze during the hostage crisis.¹⁶ These sanctions were reimposed in 1987 in response to Iran’s actions in the Persian Gulf and alleged support for terrorism, and were further expanded in 1995 to include firms dealing with the Iranian government.¹⁶

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA): A Fragile Breakthrough

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), widely known as “the Iran nuclear deal,” emerged as a comprehensive agreement reached on July 14, 2015, after more than a decade of protracted and complex negotiations.¹⁸ The agreement involved Iran and the P5+1 group, comprising the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany.¹⁸ This P5+1 coalition had formed in 2006 following the initial discovery of Iran’s secret nuclear facilities.²⁵

The JCPOA represented a significant, albeit inherently fragile, diplomatic attempt to manage nuclear proliferation risks through a complex system of verifiable limitations and reciprocal sanctions relief, demonstrating the international community’s strong preference for a negotiated solution over military intervention. Its highly detailed provisions for reducing enrichment, limiting centrifuges, and implementing extensive IAEA monitoring ³³ underscore a concerted effort to “close off Iran’s pathway to nuclear weapons” ³⁶ through non-military means. The “sanctions relief” ⁹ offered in exchange for compliance highlights the diplomatic incentive structure, indicating a clear international preference for a peaceful resolution to a complex proliferation challenge.

The core provisions of the JCPOA were designed to significantly restrict Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief:

• Uranium Enrichment: Iran committed to reducing its enriched uranium stockpile by 97% (from approximately 10,000 kg to 300 kg) for a period of 15 years and capping enrichment purity at 3.67% (a level suitable for civilian power generation but far below weapons-grade).³³ Enrichment activities were confined solely to the Natanz facility.³³
• Centrifuges: Iran agreed to significantly reduce its active centrifuges to 5,060 first-generation IR-1 machines at Natanz for 10 years, storing two-thirds of its centrifuges under IAEA monitoring.³⁵ Crucially, Iran committed to building no new enrichment facilities for 15 years.³⁵
• Heavy Water Reactor: The Arak heavy water research reactor was to be modernized based on an agreed design to minimize plutonium production, with all spent fuel to be sent out of the country.³⁵
• Fordo: The Fordo facility was to be converted into a nuclear physics and technology center, with uranium enrichment activities ceasing for at least 15 years.³⁵
• Inspections: The IAEA was granted extensive, multi-layered oversight and 24-hour access to declared nuclear facilities like Natanz and Fordo, with continuous monitoring through sophisticated equipment.⁹ The number of inspectors was tripled to enhance verification capabilities.³⁵
• Sanctions Relief: In return for Iran’s compliance, sanctions relief was provided on a rolling basis, lifting most international sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program.⁹ However, other sanctions pertaining to missile development, terrorism, and human rights remained in place.³³

The agreement also included “sunset clauses,” provisions that would gradually lift most limitations on Iran’s nuclear program after set periods (e.g., limits on advanced centrifuges after 8.5 years, enrichment levels and stockpile limits after 15 years, and the UN arms embargo after 10 years, with the UN sanctions snapback mechanism expiring in October 2025).³¹ Most experts concurred that the JCPOA’s provisions would effectively delay Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon by at least a decade.³³

The persistent tension between Iran’s perceived “right” to nuclear technology (as an NPT signatory) and international concerns about its weaponization potential created a self-perpetuating cycle of Iranian secrecy, international discovery, and escalating pressure, which the JCPOA attempted, but ultimately failed, to resolve permanently due to inherent distrust and differing long-term objectives. Iran consistently asserted its “right” to develop nuclear technology under the NPT ²¹, even while pursuing sensitive work secretly.¹⁸ The discovery of undeclared sites led to UN resolutions demanding suspension ³¹, which Iran resisted or only temporarily complied with.²³ The JCPOA aimed to bridge this gap by allowing limited enrichment under strict monitoring.³³ However, the “sunset clauses” and the ongoing debate about Iran’s true intentions ¹⁹ suggest that the fundamental distrust and the underlying tension between Iran’s national aspirations and international non-proliferation goals were never fully resolved, setting the stage for the deal’s eventual unraveling.

Key Area	JCPOA Provision	Duration/Limits	Purpose/Impact
Uranium Enrichment Level	Capped at 3.67% purity.	15 years	Sufficient for civilian power, far below weapons-grade.33
Enriched Uranium Stockpile	Reduced by 97% to 300 kg.	15 years	Limits fissile material for a bomb.33
Centrifuges in Use	Reduced to 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz.	10 years	Slows enrichment capacity, increases breakout time.35
Heavy Water Reactor (Arak)	Modernized to minimize plutonium production.	15 years (no new heavy-water reactors)	Closes alternative path to weapons-grade material.35
Fordo Facility	Converted to nuclear physics center, no enrichment.	At least 15 years	Eliminates a hardened, underground enrichment site.35
IAEA Monitoring	Extensive, 24/7 access, advanced technology.	As long as Iran remains NPT party	Ensures transparency and verification of compliance.35
Sanctions Relief	Lifting of nuclear-related international sanctions.	Contingent on compliance	Economic incentive for Iran’s compliance.33

VI. The Unraveling of the Deal: “Maximum Pressure” and Iran’s Counter-Escalation (2018-2025)

The fragility of the JCPOA became evident on May 8, 2018, when President Donald Trump announced the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the agreement and the immediate reimposition of sanctions on Iran.¹ Trump publicly denounced the deal as “horrible” and “one-sided,” arguing that it failed to bring peace and criticizing its “sunset provisions” and the exclusion of Iran’s ballistic missile program as major flaws.¹ His stated belief was that “maximalist pressure” would compel Iran to negotiate a more favorable agreement.³³ The U.S. withdrawal was a political decision, aimed against Iran and undermining multilateral diplomacy. This decision occurred despite consistent findings by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran was “fully living up to its undertakings” under the JCPOA.³⁶ This divergence between U.S. policy and IAEA verification underscored that the withdrawal was not based on technical non-compliance but rather a strategic shift driven by a desire to exert greater pressure on Iran.

The “Maximum Pressure” Campaign and its Economic Impact

Following the withdrawal, the Trump administration launched a “maximum pressure” campaign, reimposing and expanding a comprehensive array of sanctions.² These measures targeted Iran’s vital oil exports, its financial institutions (including the Central Bank of Iran), shipping, and other commercial dealings, with the explicit aim of destabilizing its economy and forcing a renegotiation of the nuclear deal to include ballistic missiles and regional activities.² The campaign had a severe economic impact, with Iran’s Gross Official Reserves reportedly falling from an average of $70 billion in 2017 to $4 billion in 2020, and President Rouhani stating that sanctions had deprived the economy of $200 billion in oil revenue and investments.³⁹

The “Maximum Pressure” campaign, however, largely backfired, leading to Iran’s counter-escalation and an increased risk of proliferation. Instead of compelling Iran to renegotiate, the severe economic strain emboldened Iranian hardliners and prompted Tehran to reduce its compliance with the JCPOA.² This demonstrated that an exclusively punitive policy without diplomatic off-ramps can incentivize an adversary to “fight fire with fire,” leading to a more dangerous situation rather than compliance.³⁹

Iran’s Counter-Escalation and Regional Activities

In response to the U.S. withdrawal and the crippling sanctions, Iran began to systematically reduce its compliance with the JCPOA’s restrictions. By early July 2019, Iran had breached limits on its stockpile of enriched uranium and the level of enrichment. By early 2021, its stockpile was more than 12 times the JCPOA limit, and enrichment had reached 20% purity, far exceeding the 3.67% cap.³³ Furthermore, Iran restricted the international community’s ability to inspect its nuclear sites and increased production of enriched uranium.⁹

Concurrently, Iran escalated its regional activities, often through its network of proxy groups. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, designated as a terrorist group, controlled proxy powers such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, which was responsible for attacks against U.S. targets.⁹ Iran-backed militias began attacking oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and shot down a U.S. drone.² Attacks by Iran-backed groups on bases in Iraq inhabited by U.S. forces continued, and Iran provided materiel support, including short-range ballistic missiles, to armed factions throughout the region, such as Hamas and the Houthis in Yemen.¹ Iran’s regional activities and its ballistic missile program became central to U.S. concerns post-JCPOA, shifting the focus from purely nuclear non-proliferation to broader regional stability and security. The JCPOA only addressed Iran’s nuclear program, not its “revisionism or ballistic missile programs”.² When the U.S. withdrew, it explicitly aimed to address these broader concerns.² This led to a situation where Iran’s continued development of missiles and support for proxies, seen as a means to compensate for conventional military shortcomings ⁴⁵, increasingly became a flashpoint, directly contributing to the escalating tensions that ultimately led to military action.

VII. The Path to Direct Military Action (2023-2025)

The period between 2023 and 2025 witnessed a significant intensification of tensions, marked by a series of attacks by Iran-backed groups on U.S. forces and allies, and direct military exchanges between Iran and Israel. Following the October 2023 attack on Israel led by Hamas, an Iran-backed group, Iran-supported groups in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen launched a parallel campaign of attacks on Israeli and U.S. targets.⁴⁴ These included rocket and drone attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria, and a deadly drone attack on the Tower 22 facility in Jordan.⁴⁰ Iran itself directly attacked Israel with ballistic missiles in April and October 2024.⁴⁵ This escalation of proxy conflicts and Iran’s nuclear advancements created an environment where military action became perceived as necessary. The consistent attacks by Iran’s proxies and its own missile strikes against Israel, coupled with its increasing uranium enrichment, contributed to a sense of urgency in Washington and Jerusalem that non-military options were insufficient to contain the perceived threat.

U.S. Intelligence Assessments and the Breakout Capability

Amidst these escalating tensions, U.S. intelligence assessments regarding Iran’s nuclear program became a critical factor. While the U.S. intelligence community consistently assessed that Iran had “halted its nuclear weapons program in late 2003” and was “not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device,” it also noted Iran’s “capacity to produce nuclear weapons at some point”.⁴ A central point of concern was Iran’s “breakout time”—the estimated time needed to produce enough weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) for one nuclear weapon. Estimates varied, but by May 2025, a Defense Intelligence Agency assessment suggested Iran could produce this amount in “probably less than one week”.⁵² This short breakout time, coupled with Iran’s increased stockpiles of enriched uranium (some nearing 60% purity, a short technical step from weapons-grade 90%) and operation of advanced centrifuges, fueled fears that Iran was “very close” to having a nuclear bomb, despite official intelligence stating no decision had been made to weaponize.⁴

The U.S. Rationale and Policy Shift

The U.S. decision to intervene militarily was driven by several factors. Israel consistently viewed a nuclear-armed Iran as an “existential threat” and expressed its determination to prevent Iran from acquiring atomic weapons.⁴ While the U.S. had previously sought to deter Iran, the escalating situation and the perceived imminence of Iran’s nuclear capability led to a shift in policy. Crucially, only the United States possessed the munitions capable of penetrating and potentially destroying Iran’s heavily fortified underground nuclear facilities, such as Fordo, which is buried deep under a mountain.³ This unique capability, particularly the GBU-57 A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (“bunker buster”) bomb, made U.S. involvement strategically necessary for achieving Israel’s stated objective of “decapitating” Iran’s nuclear program.³

President Trump’s public stance evolved from expressing a preference for diplomacy and urging Israel to hold off on military action, to increasingly pointed warnings and a readiness to act.¹ He stated, “I’m not looking to fight… But if it’s a choice between fighting and having a nuclear weapon, you have to do what you have to do”.⁵⁴ This shift reflected a move from deterrence to what was perceived as a necessary preemption. The U.S. decision reflects a shift from deterrence to preemption, where the perceived immediacy of the nuclear threat outweighed the risks of direct military confrontation. The U.S. military action was a calculated risk, aiming to degrade Iran’s nuclear capabilities significantly, but carrying the inherent risk of a wider regional conflict.

VIII. Consequences and Future Outlook

The U.S. military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025 have ignited a geopolitical inferno with far-reaching implications. While Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization confirmed the attacks, it insisted that its nuclear program would not be stopped.⁴ Initial reports from Iran and the IAEA indicated no immediate signs of radioactive contamination at the targeted sites.³

Effectiveness of Military Strikes

The immediate tactical success of the strikes was asserted by President Trump, who claimed the sites were “completely and totally obliterated”.⁵² However, experts offer a more nuanced view on the long-term strategic impact. While the strikes may have “disrupted the program’s momentum” and dealt a “significant blow” to Iran’s ability to produce fissile material, particularly if Fordo was seriously damaged, they are unlikely to eliminate Iran’s nuclear aspirations permanently.⁵² The Iranian nuclear program is decades old and draws on extensive indigenous expertise. The physical elimination of infrastructure, or even the assassination of scientists, is insufficient to destroy the latent knowledge within the country.⁵⁷ This suggests that while the strikes have immediate tactical success, their long-term strategic impact remains uncertain, as Iran retains the expertise and potential resolve to reconstitute its program.

Potential Iranian Retaliation

Iran faces a stark dilemma: retaliate and risk a wider war, or pause to consolidate domestically.⁵⁷ Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned prior to the strikes that any attacks would “result in irreparable damage” for the U.S., and Iran’s Foreign Ministry declared that “any American intervention would be a recipe for an all-out war in the region”.¹ Potential avenues for Iranian retaliation include:

• Targeting the Strait of Hormuz: Iran could disrupt this narrow passage, through which about 20% of the world’s traded oil passes, using its fleet of fast-attack boats and naval mines.¹
• Attacks on U.S. Bases and Allies: The U.S. has tens of thousands of troops stationed at bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, which are closer to Iran than Israel and could be targeted by missiles or drone swarms.¹ Iran could also target critical oil and gas facilities in these countries.¹
• Activation of Regional Proxies: Despite their diminished capabilities, Iran could call upon groups like the Houthis in Yemen or allied militias in Iraq to launch drone and missile attacks against U.S. forces and interests.¹
• Acceleration of Nuclear Program: Experts caution that strikes might only delay, not eliminate, Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran could choose to end cooperation with the IAEA and withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, losing international visibility of its program but potentially accelerating weaponization efforts in secret.¹ This action has a high risk of escalation and unintended consequences, as military strikes and assassinations, while degrading technical capabilities, risk having the exact opposite effect on Iran’s threat perceptions and calculations, potentially leading to a decision in Tehran that a nuclear weapons capability is the only effective deterrent.⁵⁷

Broader Geopolitical Implications

The U.S.-Iran conflict has ignited a new era of geopolitical volatility with far-reaching implications. Oil prices have surged due to fears of supply disruptions, creating volatility in energy markets.⁵⁸ The defense sector is experiencing a boom, with increased demand for missile defense systems, stealth bombers, and cybersecurity technologies.⁵⁸

International reactions have been mixed, with many nations and international bodies calling for de-escalation and a return to diplomacy.⁶⁰ The UN Secretary-General expressed “grave alarm,” warning of “catastrophic consequences” if the conflict escalates further.⁶⁰ Key U.S. allies like the UK, EU, France, and Germany, while acknowledging the threat of Iran’s nuclear program, urged a return to negotiations.⁶⁰ Conversely, Russia condemned the strikes as a “gross violation of international law” and claimed some countries were prepared to supply Tehran with nuclear weapons.⁶⁰ Iraq, Qatar, Oman, Hamas, and the Houthis also condemned the strikes, emphasizing the risk of regional destabilization.⁶⁰ This highlights that the future of non-proliferation and regional stability hinges on the next steps, as the U.S. action risks seriously weakening trust in international institutions and arrangements essential for global security.³⁶ The potential for Iran to withdraw from the NPT could become a catalyst for broader proliferation in the region.⁵⁷

Conclusion

The direct U.S. military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025 represent a profound and dangerous culmination of a deeply complex and antagonistic relationship, rooted in historical grievances and evolving strategic imperatives. The 1953 coup, a pivotal U.S. intervention to protect economic interests and contain perceived Soviet influence, irrevocably poisoned the well, fostering deep-seated anti-American sentiment and inadvertently laying the groundwork for the anti-Western nature of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. This revolution, in turn, transformed Iran into an ideological adversary, leading to the Hostage Crisis, which solidified economic sanctions as a primary U.S. tool of pressure.

Iran’s post-revolution nuclear program, initially paused, was revived and accelerated primarily as a strategic imperative for regime survival in a hostile regional environment. The discovery of secret facilities in the early 2000s triggered intense international scrutiny and a multilateral sanctions regime, culminating in the fragile JCPOA. This agreement, a testament to the international community’s preference for diplomacy, aimed to manage proliferation risks through verifiable limitations and sanctions relief.

However, the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, driven by political objectives and a “maximum pressure” strategy, proved to be a critical miscalculation. Instead of compelling Iran to renegotiate, it led to Iran’s counter-escalation, including increased uranium enrichment and heightened regional proxy activities. This created an environment of escalating tensions, where U.S. intelligence assessments of Iran’s rapidly shrinking nuclear “breakout time” converged with Israel’s existential threat perceptions, ultimately leading to the U.S. decision for direct military intervention.

The recent strikes, while tactically effective in degrading Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, carry immense risks. They have not eliminated Iran’s nuclear knowledge or its strategic resolve, potentially incentivizing a more covert and determined pursuit of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. The immediate future is fraught with the risk of Iranian retaliation, whether through disrupting global energy supplies, attacking U.S. bases and allies, or activating its regional proxies. The broader geopolitical implications are severe, threatening regional stability, impacting global markets, and further eroding the international non-proliferation regime. The path forward demands urgent diplomatic engagement to de-escalate the conflict and prevent a wider, potentially catastrophic, regional war, acknowledging that military action alone cannot resolve the deep-seated historical and strategic dilemmas at the core of the U.S.-Iran confrontation.

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